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Abstract 
Marine resource depletion is a critical concern for humankind. Individual Transferable Quota 
(ITQ) regimes are among the most effective measures to tackle this problem. Employing an 
experimental approach, this study examines the rationality of fishers under an ITQ regime. In 
particular, this study focuses on the case where fishers can change their own vessel scales in the 
beginning of each period in each experiment. We find that the higher the quota price is, the more 
irrationally fishers behave. Moreover, vessel scales and initial allocations can influence the 
rationality of fishers. 
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1. Introduction 
Marine resources are of critical importance for the survival of humanity. Individual Transferable 
Quota (ITQ) regimes are considered to be one of the most effective measures for tackling the 
problem of over capacity and excess harvest (Costello at al., 2008). The main engine of ITQ 
regimes is the “market mechanism,” which has also been adopted in other kinds of 
environmental resource management.1  Under this regime, an authority determines the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) and the initial allocation of fishing rights/quotas. Fishers are able to 
transact those fishing rights/quotas in the quota market. This regime has been introduced in 
several countries, such as New Zealand, Iceland, and Australia, since the 1980s.2 Under an ITQ 
regime, inefficient fishers gain more from selling portions of their quotas to efficient fishers than 
they would from harvesting by themselves. Thus, fishers under such a regime do not compete 
with each other to catch the most fish.  
However, theoretical and empirical studies have revealed some defects of ITQs, including 
price instability, market power, and risk. Newell et al. (2005) found that quota prices can be 
unstable for the first several periods after the introduction of an ITQ system, as was the case in 
New Zealand. One possible reason for this instability is speculation. Fishers may expect that they 
will be able to resell their quotas later at a higher price. Price instability is an important issue for 
the rational behavior of fishers and, accordingly, for efficient resource management. 3 
Experimental approaches have also shed light on the functions of ITQ regimes. Anderson 
(2004) and Anderson and Sutinen (2005) performed basic experiments for ITQ regimes and 
found that quota prices may be much higher than those in the equilibrium scenario in which 
efficiency is achieved. Anderson and Sutinen (2006) demonstrated that the introduction of initial 
lease periods mitigates the problem of instability of quota prices. Anderson et al. (2008) 
                                                 
1 Tradable emissions permits are among the measures that use the market mechanism. 
2 For empirical case studies and the evaluation of ITQ regimes, see, for example, Clark et al. (1988), 
Dupont and Grafton (2001), Eythorsson (2000), Gauvin et al. (1994), Kompas and Che (2005), Newell  et 
al. (2005), and Weninger (1998). 
3 Bergland and Pederson (2006) considered the case in which some fishers are risk averse and proved that 
these fishers buy fewer quotas compared to those who are risk neutral. Moreover, Anderson (1991) 
demonstrated that the total cost to harvest a certain amount of fish is not minimized when some fishers 
have market power in the quota market. Furthermore, rational behavior has long been analyzed in the 
literature (e.g., Becker, 1962; Chen et al., 2006). 
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examined the relationship between cost structures and the situations of quota markets. Moreover, 
they investigated the efficiency of quota markets by comparing the realized total profit of fishers 
with the possible total profit when the most efficient allocation of quotas is achieved. 
Whereas these prior experimental studies have focused on quota prices and efficiency, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine experimentally the rationality of the behavior of fishers. We 
define a fisher as rational when he or she chooses a harvest amount such that his or her own 
profit from fishing is maximized given the quota price.  
In particular, this study focuses on the following points. First, we consider the case where 
fishers can change their own vessel scales in the beginning of each period in each experiment. 
The vessel scales change as time goes on under an ITQ regime in the real world, because fishers 
optimize their own vessels. Thus, it is important to investigate whether fishers can be rational 
even when vessel scales vary. Second, as pointed out in the literature, the price of quotas is likely 
to be biased upward and unstable. Therefore, we investigate whether or not this bias of the quota 
price and/or instability lead to the irrationality of fishers. Third, initial allocation can also 
influence the behavior of fishers, and the way of initial allocation has been controversial in the 
real situations. We conduct three series of experiments: the initial allocations of those series are 
different from each other.  In addition to basic analyses of the experiment, we perform a 
regression on the behaviors of fishers to identify factors that significantly influence the rational 
behavior of fishers. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, including the 
theoretical background. Section 3 examines the results on quota prices and harvest amounts. 
Section 4 describes the estimation methods used to investigate the rational behavior of 
fishers/subjects and presents the results. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Consider a fishery with N  fishers. Each of Sn  fishers engages in fishing with one small-scale 
vessel, whereas each of SnN   fishers engages in fishing with one large-scale vessel. These two 
types of fishers are referred to as type S and type L, respectively. Each fisher harvests fish stock 
of a single species. All vessels of a given type are identical. Moreover, all fishers use an identical 
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fishing technique, so cost conditions are equal for all fishers with the same type of vessel. 
The cost structure of each type of vessel is as follows: 
    iiiii FqcqC  , ,0,0  ii cc                                                                                         (1) 
where iq , ic , and iF  denote the amount of catch, the variable cost, and the fixed cost of type 
 LSii , , respectively. It is assumed that LS FF   and LS cc   for any given amount of catch. 
Moreover, because we assume the existence of fixed costs and increasing marginal costs, there 
exists a unique amount of catch that minimizes the average cost ( AC ) for each type,  LSiqi ,ˆ  . 
We assume that a large-scale fisher is more efficient than a small-scale fisher in the sense that 
    .ˆˆ,ˆˆ LSLLSS qqqACqAC                                                                                          (2) 
Figure 1 shows both types of cost structures.4 
The government introduces an ITQ program for the fishery, sets a TAC (denoted by Q ), and 
determines the initial allocation to each fisher. The amount of Q  and the initial allocation are 
constants for fishers. The demand curve for fish is downward sloping: 
 QPp  ,      .0P                                                                                                                (3) 
Unless the government changes the TAC level, the price of fish does not change. Note that this 
fish price is the price of output which is different from the quota price. 
Quotas are transacted between fishers in a perfectly competitive market, which means that 
both types of fishers are price takers in the quota market. We assume that fishers do not choose to 
quit fishing by selling their entire quotas. It is further assumed that new entry and exit do not 
take place because of the initial costs of entry and the costs of switching to other industries. Thus, 
a seller sells only a part of the quota he or she holds. Here, we exclude the case in which a fisher 
does not use part of his or her quota in an effort to manipulate the quota price. 
Each type of fisher determines the amount of his or her catch and, accordingly, the amount of 
quotas that must be bought or sold so that the fisher’s profit is maximized given the price of 
quotas. The profit function of fisher j  with vessel type i  is given by the following: 
      ,,,,,,, LSiqqrqCqQp jjijiijiji                                                          (4) 
                                                 
4 In reality, larger vessels might be less efficient in some cases. However, the assumption that larger 
vessels are more efficient does not matter for our purposes. The opposite case can be analyzed in a similar 
way both theoretically and experimentally. 
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where r  and jq  denote the price of quotas and the initial allocation for fisher j , respectively. 
The first-order condition is as follows: 
  .0 rcQp i                                                                                                                       (5) 
As defined in the introduction, when a fisher is rational, which implies that he or she maximizes 
the profits from fishing activities given quota price, he or she catches the amount that satisfies 
(5).  
Let Sq~  ( Lq~ ) denote the amount of catch of each small-scale (large-scale) fisher in 
equilibrium. Then, the following conditions hold given the number of each type of fisher: 
   ,~~ LLSS qcqc                                                                                                                         (6) 
.~)(~ QqnNqn LSSS                                                                                                     (7) 
The equilibrium outputs and the quota price can be represented as   ),(,~ LSiQnq Si   and 
 Qnr S ,~ , respectively. Thus, if all fishers are rational, the following condition is satisfied for 
each fisher: 
          .,,0,~,~ LSiQnrQnqcQp LLii                                                                     (5)’ 
We note that the amounts of catches are not influenced by the initial allocations as long as the 
numbers of both types of vessels are fixed. 
From (6) and the assumption that LS cc   for any given amount of catch, it is clear that the 
amount of catch of a large-scale fisher is greater than that of a small-scale fisher for any given 
quota price. This relation implies that with a greater number of large-scale fishers, the total 
demand for quotas increases and the quota price is higher in equilibrium.5 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
2.2.1 Basic sessions 
We conducted eight basic sessions, during which 12 subjects per session traded quotas in a 
computerized double auction. All subjects were under 30 years old, and they were mainly 
undergraduate and vocational school students. Each subject participated in one session only, and 
subjects were paid an average of US $30 based on an exchange rate of 100 Japanese yen = US $1. 
                                                 
5 The presence of more large-scale fishers implies fewer small-scale fishers because the total number  of 
fishers ( N ) is fixed. 
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At the beginning of each session, subjects read the instructions for about 10 minutes.6 In this 
experiment, each session includes 10 periods, and each period is divided into two stages. 
At the beginning of each period, each subject is given an initial allocation. In the first stage, 
the subject chooses between a large and a small fishing vessel. In the second stage, the subject 
can adjust his or her quota holdings by buying or/and selling quotas in the double auction scheme. 
To familiarize subjects with the experiments, we ran two training periods before beginning the 
paying periods. 
We use technical terms specific to fisheries to describe the experimental design and results in 
this paper. However, terminology that is more neutral was used with the subjects. For example, 
we referred to a fish quota as a “coupon” and to marginal cost as marginal “production cost.” 
After the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire to measure their risk preferences.7 We 
conducted the experiment using the University of Zurich’s Z-tree program (Fischbacher, 1999).8 
 
2.2.2 Choice of vessel type 
In the first stage, each subject chose a method of production of either Type 1 (small-scale) or 
Type 2 (large-scale). The fixed cost of Type 1 was smaller than that of Type 2, whereas the 
marginal/variable cost of Type 1 was larger than that of Type 2 (see Figure 1). This cost structure 
corresponds to that in the theoretical background. In this experiment, the price of fish was fixed 
at 30. In other words, the revenue from selling one unit of fish was always 30.  It should be 
emphasized that this price is not the quota price but the price of output. At the beginning of each 
period, each subject was given eight quotas as an initial allocation, which implies that the TAC 
was 96. Each subject was also given a sheet on which fixed and marginal costs of both 
production types were written (see Table 1 for the cost structures). From the end of the first stage 
through the second stage in each period, each subject could view on his or her own display the 
numbers of both types of vessels chosen by all subjects.9 
The first stage was designed in this way for the following reasons. One of our purposes was 
                                                 
6 The instruction manual is available upon request. 
7 See Appendix for details on the questionnaire.  
8 These sessions were conducted at the Yokohama National University in September 2009 and January 
2010. Each session lasted about one and one half hours. 
9 Subjects could not identify who had chosen which type of vessel. They could see only the numbers of 
both types of vessels chosen in the period. 
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to examine whether vessel scale influences the rationality of fishers. Therefore, vessel scale and 
the characteristics of each subject should be independent. Subjects changed their vessel types 
about three times on average, and the number of subjects who changed their vessel types did not 
clearly decrease throughout the periods, at least until the eighth period. Figure 2 shows the 
average ratio of subjects who changed their vessel types in each period as compared with the 
previous period.10 Therefore, we conclude that our design of the first stage worked well for our 
analysis. 
 
2.2.3 Quota-trading stage 
In the second stage, each subject can adjust his or her quota holdings by buying or/and selling 
quotas in the double auction scheme. We consider that a rational fisher maximizes his or her own 
profit from fishing activities. Similarly, in the controlled experiment, subjects buy and/or sell 
quotas to maximize their own profits from “production” activities, which are determined by (a) 
how many quotas the subject holds after trading and (b) how many quotas the subject buys 
and/or sells.  
A deal was made whenever a buyer (a seller) accepted the current bid (the current ask price). 
After each trade, the current bid and ask price were closed and the market opened for a new set 
of bids and ask prices. The history of trading prices was displayed on the screen. The quota 
market was open for the entire period, which lasted three minutes. 
 
2.2.4 Additional sessions and initial allocations 
We conducted two more series of eight sessions, for a total of 16 additional sessions.11 In these 
additional sessions, quotas were not allocated equally. We represent the first series of eight 
additional sessions as Allowance 1 (A1) and the second series of eight sessions as Allowance 2 
(A2). In the A1 series, each of six subjects was given six quotas, and each of the other six 
subjects was given 10 quotas. On the other hand, in the A2 series, each of six subjects was given 
five quotas, and each of the other six subjects was given 11 quotas/coupons. All other details 
were the same as in the basic sessions, including TAC, which remained equal to 96. 
We conducted these additional series for the following reasons. Under an ITQ regime, when 
                                                 
10 The terms “Allowance 1” and “Allowance 2” in Figure 2 are explained in 2.2.4. 
11 These sessions were conducted at the Yokohama National University in February and March 2010. 
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speculation takes place, fishers do not maximize their own profits from fishing activities. They 
may try to gain from quota transaction itself.12 In such a case, the amount of quotas in a fisher’s 
possession can affect his or her rational behavior. Therefore, the effect of changes in fishers’ 
initial allocations should be investigated.  
 
3. Results: Quota Prices and Amounts of Harvests 
Because subjects were able to choose a new type of vessel in each period, the theoretical 
equilibrium price (TEP), which corresponds to  Qnr L ,~  as defined in the previous section, 
depended on the numbers of both types of vessels. The list of TEPs is shown in Table 2. Some of 
them are not integers because there is more than one possible equilibrium price. The results for 
basic sessions are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.  
First, because the numbers of both types of vessels change in each period, we examine 
whether the average of actual trading prices (AATP) converges to the TEP. Figure 3 shows the 
average ratios of AATPs to TEPs for all sessions in the basic, A1, and A2 series. It is clear that 
the AATPs converged to the TEPs in all three series. This convergence implies that efficiency 
improves through periods when we focus on quota prices even if the vessel scales change.  
Next, we ask whether subjects behaved rationally. Table 5 shows the relationship between the 
quota price and the harvest amount chosen by a rational fisher under that quota price. Figure 4 
shows the average of the absolute values of the differences between the actual harvest amounts 
and the amounts that rational fishers/subjects would choose under AATPs. Hereafter, we let 
PDCATCH  denote the difference. Figure 4 suggests that irrationality lingers through periods in 
terms of the maximization of profits from fishing activities. In other words, subjects failed in 
choosing their harvest amounts so that their own profits from fishing activities are maximized.  
We chose to use absolute values as our measure of irrationality. In our experiment, the total 
allowable catch is fixed by TAC. Thus, when some subjects chose amounts greater than what 
would have been chosen if they had behaved rationally, the other subjects necessarily chose 
amounts smaller than those they would have chosen if they had behaved rationally. Therefore, 
the use of absolute values as the measure of irrationality is appropriate.  
                                                 
12 In the experiment, we do not consider carry-over of quotas through periods. Therefore, quotas are not 
long-term assets. In the present context, “speculation” means that fishers try to sell quotas at higher prices 
than what they bought  in each period (three minutes). 
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We can see from Figure 4 that the values of PDCATCH of the base, A1, and A2 series differ 
from each other. To confirm these differences in PDCATCH , we applied the Mann-Whitney test. 
Table 6 shows the results of Mann-Whitney tests of all possible pairs in three different series. We 
take PDCATCH  as observed variable. The Mann-Whitney test can evaluate the hypothesis that 
two independent samples are selected from populations with the same distribution. The test 
results indicate that the value of PDCATCH  in each series is significantly different from its 
values in all other series. Because the difference between any two series lies in the initial 
allocations, it can be said that the initial allocations influence the rationality of fishers’ behavior 
in the quota market.  
 
4. The Estimation 
4.1 The method 
In the previous section, we observed irrationality using the AATP and amounts of harvests. This 
section examines factors that cause the irrationality.  
We estimate the following equation separately for each series using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). 
     

4
1
4,3,2,1, 2
k
k
ikitititi
PP
ti riskAllocationSelectTPVAATPcDCATCH  
where i  represents the index for subjects; t  represents the index for periods; AATP  is the 
average of actual trading prices; TPV  represents the variance of AATP; Select2 a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when a subject chooses a large-scale vessel and 0 when a subject chooses a 
small-scale vessel; Allocation is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a subject is given a smaller 
initial allocation and 0 when a subject is given a larger initial allocation (in the basic series, the 
value of Allocation is 0 for all fishers); and krisk  represents risk preference, where the values 1–
4 indicate different degrees of risk preference.13 These values are based on the results of a pretest 
survey carried out before the experiments and were added to the model to control for 
heterogeneous risk preferences. 
    As noted above, we need to observe the relationship between the AATP and the rational 
behavior of subjects because quota prices are likely to be biased upwards, as verified in the 
                                                 
13 For the meanings of the coefficients of risk factors, see the Appendix. 
10 
 
literature. It is likely that the larger the upward bias of the quota price is, the more transactions 
are made for speculation.14 In turn, when more transactions are made for speculation, the amount 
of harvest of each subject becomes less rational in terms of maximizing the profit from fishing 
activities. Thus, 1  is expected to be positive. When the variance of trading prices is large, it is 
difficult for fishers to behave rationally. Therefore, 2  is also expected to be positive.  
Moreover, from Table 5, the following relationships are considered to hold between the quota 
price and the amounts of harvests when subjects are price takers and choose the amount 
rationally15 : 
5.225.22  PifPqTL , and ,5.220  PifqTL  
,165.08  PifPqTS  and 160  PifqTS ,  
where P  denotes the quota price. Thus, the effect of the price change on the harvest amount is 
greater for a large-scale fisher than it is for a small-scale fisher. Therefore, 3  is expected to be 
positive.  
Finally, if speculation takes place, it is likely that as the quotas a subject has increase, so too 
does their incentive to dabble in speculation. Thus, 4  is expected to be negative. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results 
Table 7 provides the results for all three series. The AATP significantly affects the irrationality of 
the choice of harvest amount: the higher the AATP, the greater the value of PDCATCH  becomes. 
The upward biases of quota prices have been verified in the literature and in our experiments (see 
Figure 3). The estimation result suggests that these upward biases lead to irrationality of subjects. 
The higher the quota price is, the less likely it becomes that subjects will be able to maximize 
their own profits from fishing activities given the quota price. We also verify that the simple 
correlation between PDCATCH  and (AATP – TEP) shows a positive relationship. This finding 
also implies that the larger the gap between AATP and TEP is, the less likely it is that subjects are 
rational.  
Some other independent variables also affect the harvest amount significantly. As expected, 
                                                 
14 See footnote 12 for the meaning of speculation in the present context. 
15 In the experiments, subjects were able to choose the units discretely.  
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the choices of a large-scale vessel and a larger initial allocation positively affect PDCATCH . On 
the other hand, although TPV  of series A2 has a significant influence on PDCATCH , the value 
is very small. Moreover, no significant relationships between TPV and PDCATCH  were seen in 
the other two series. Thus, TPV is not likely to affect irrational harvesting amounts. 
One of the important factors causing irrationality is speculation. Although we assume that 
subjects maximized their own profits from fishing activities, when the quota price is upward 
biased and unstable, subjects have more to gain from speculation than from fishing activities. 
This factor can also influence the effect of a change in initial allocation on the gap between the 
actual harvest amount and the amount that a rational subject would choose given AATP. When 
quota prices are easily biased, initial allocations can play an important role in determining the 
degree of irrationality. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Markets generate rationality by setting a fee on irrational behavior (Becker, 1962). Employing an 
experimental approach, we examined the rational behavior of fishers, because the rationality is a 
key to the function of ITQ regimes. We found that the upward biases of quota prices lead to 
irrationality of the choices of harvest amounts by fishers. Vessel scales and initial allocations can 
also influence irrationality significantly.  
Consequently, several key points can be made about how to ensure Individual Transferable 
Quota (ITQ) regimes function well. First, rules that encourage the convergence of quota prices to 
the theoretical equilibrium prices should accompany ITQ regimes. In other words, the upward 
bias of quota prices should be removed as soon as possible. Second, initial allocations should be 
carefully chosen. In the real world, allocations are usually determined according to records of 
past catches. In some cases, allocations may need to be updated. Third, it may be that even vessel 
scales should be controlled because the vessel scale of a fisher affects her/his behavior in the ITQ 
market. At least, in transition periods from a non-ITQ regime to an ITQ regime, some controls on 
vessel scales may be justified to stabilize the quota price. 
We assumed that subjects are price takers in the quota market, and we elaborated the 
experimental design to make subjects behave as price takers. In reality, however, some fishers 
may have market power, in particular, when only a small number of fishers participates in an 
12 
 
ITQ program. Thus, it is our goal in future studies to investigate fishers’ behavior more carefully. 
Another important goal for future research is to investigate what rules and controls are 
effective. In tackling this issue, we need to gain detailed information not only on prices and 
vessel scales but also on the behavior of fishers.  
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of four questions on risk attitudes, which are similar to other 
psychological surveys related to experiments. 
 
1) What is the lowest probability of precipitation at which you carry an umbrella? 
2) If you have an appointment to meet your friends, how far ahead of time do you get to the 
meeting place? 
3) How often do you cross the street against a red light when there is no traffic? 
4) Are you usually careful with fire and secure lockup of your house? To what extent? 
 
 
In Table 8, “risk 1” through “risk 4” correspond to questions 1 through 4 above, respectively. For 
“risk 1” and “risk 4”, we process the data so that the risk lovers (risk averters) get higher (lower) 
scores. On the other hand, for “risk 2” and “risk 3”, we process the data so that the risk averters 
(risk lovers) get higher (lower) scores. 
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Figure 2: The average ratio of subjects who change their vessel types as compared with the 
previous round. 
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Figure 3: The average ratio of actual trading prices (ATP) to theoretical equilibrium price 
(TEP) in each period in Basic, A1, and A2 series 
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Figure 4: 
PDCATCH  (the average of the absolute values of the differences between the 
actual harvest amounts and the amounts which rational fishers/subjects would choose 
under AATP) 
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Table 1: Cost structures of both types of vessels 
  Type1: Small scale Type2: Large scale 
fishing 
amount Total cost Marginal cost Total cost Marginal cost 
0(fix cost) 20   80   
1 35 15 88 8 
2 52 17 97 9 
3 71 19 107 10 
4 92 21 118 11 
5 115 23 130 12 
6 140 25 143 13 
7 167 27 157 14 
8 196 29 172 15 
9 227 31 188 16 
10 260 33 205 17 
11 295 35 223 18 
12 332 37 242 19 
13 371 39 262 20 
14 412 41 283 21 
15 455 43 305 22 
16 500 45 328 23 
17 547 47 352 24 
18 596 49 377 25 
19 647 51 403 26 
20 700 53 430 27 
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Table 2: Theoretical equilibrium price (TEP) 
   Number of Vessels Theoretically Equilibrium 
Price (TEP)
 Type1(S)=9,  Type2(L)=3        5.5
Type1(S)=8,  Type2(L)=4         7 
 Type1(S)=7,  Type2(L)=5         9 
Type1(S)=6,  Type2(L)=6         9.5 
 Type1(S)=5,  Type2(L)=7       11
 Type1(S)=4,  Type2(L)=8        11.5 
 Type1(S)=3,  Type2(L)=9        12.5 
 Type1(S)=2,  Type2(L)=10       13
  
* Some of them are not integers, since there is more than one possible equilibrium price. 
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Table 3: The Average of actual trading prices (AATP), variance, and numbers of vessels of 
each session of the basic series 
Session Average Trading Price     (ATP) Variance of price Type 1 (S)
Type 2 
(L) 
1 11.64 102.25 5.1 6.9 
2 10.34  18.04 4 8 
3  8.10  94.58 4.5 7.5 
4 11.58  40.22 5.4 6.6 
5 14.31 207.19 5.8 6.2 
6  9.20  56.86 4.3 7.7 
7 15.48 109.93 6.2 5.8 
8 15.62 1862.34 4.9 7.1 
Average 12.03 311.43 5.025 6.975 
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Table 4: The average of actual trading prices (AATP), variance, and numbers of vessels of 
each period of the basic series 
Period Average Trading Price    (ATP) Variance of price
Type 1 
(S) 
Type 2 
(L) 
1 12.94  88.33 4.75 7.25 
2 14.20 104.59 5 7 
3 13.53 263.17 4.875 7.125 
4 12.63  61.69 5.125 6.875 
5 11.79  81.72 5.125 6.875 
6 10.95  49.41 5.5 6.5 
7 10.99  69.11 5 7 
8 10.23  26.86 4.75 7.25 
9 12.29 2275.77 5.125 6.875 
10 10.79  93.60 5 7 
Average 12.03 311.43 5.025 6.975 
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Table 5: The relationship between the quota price and the harvest amount when a fisher is 
a price taker and choose the harvest amount rationally (to maximize her/his own profit). 
 
Quota Price The Harvest Amount 
of a Large-scale 
The Harvest Amount 
of a Small-scale 
5 17.5 5.5 
6 16.5 5 
7 15.5 4.5 
8 14.5 4 
9 13.5 3.5 
10 12.5 3 
11 11.5 2.5 
12 10.5 2
13 9.5 1.5
14 8.5 1 
15 7.5 0.5
16 6.5 0 
 
* In the experiment, subjects were able to choose the units discretely. However, in many cases, 
subjects are indifferent between the alternative of two candidates of units. For example, when the 
quota price is 8, a large-scale fisher is indifferent between the alternative of 14 or 15. Thus, we 
put 14.5 in the corresponding box.  
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Table 6: Mann-Whitney test result: Comparing test of inefficiency/irrationality on the 
harvest amounts int in each series 
 
 DCATCH
P 
Base vs Allowance1 -3.402***
Base vs Allowance2 3.214***
Allowance1 vs Allowance2 3.780***
 
 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7: Estimation result for PDCATCH  
 
  Dependent variable: DCATCHP 
  base A1 A2 
AATP 0.1998*** 0.7019* 0.0791** 
(4.94) (1.82) (2.46) 
TPV 0.0002 0.0001 0.0011*** 
(0.34) (-1.42) (2.79) 
Select L 2.1994*** 4.5107*** 1.0729*** 
(8.15) (13.84) (4.22) 
Risk1 0.0292 -0.0813** -0.0276 
(1.22) (-2.52) (-1.17) 
Risk2 0.0534 -0.0217* -0.0001 
(1.05) (-1.96) (-0.00) 
Risk3 -2.9449*** 1.310 -0.1694 
(-4.46) (1.53) (-0.29) 
Risk4 -0.0181 -0.7952*** 0.3688*** 
(-0.13) (-4.17) (2.71) 
Allocation   -1.6649*** 0.0277 
(small)   (-5.13) (0.11) 
c 1.8471** 6.4228*** 2.5035*** 
  (2.29) (5.98) (3.09) 
R2 0.1145 0.2298 0.0428 
 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
